The deregulation of domestic financial markets and the capital account in developing countries has frequently been associated with financial turmoil and macro volatility. Neither domestic institutions nor the rules of the game of the international financial architecture have been able to cope effectively with certain financial disequilibria. This book analyzes the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand, and draws implications for building development-friendly domestic and international financial architectures. The central conclusion of the studies is that there is a bi-directional causality between volatility and institutions: high volatility and crises contribute to deteriorating the rules of the financial game; weak institutions reduce financial deepening and the ability to manage risks; and, this feeds aggregate volatility. Hence, the policy recommendations are made in light of the key challenge: to design and implement policies able to control volatility while building the rules of the financial game that will ultimately contribute to mitigating the sources of aggregate risk.