This book deserves wide attention. I hope it inspires thoughtful debate - not just among international financial insiders in the world's capitals, but on Capitol Hill and Wall Street and their European counterparts, and in the university and business school classrooms of China, India, South Africa, Brazil and beyond.'
"Nancy Birdsall, President of the Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C."
This is a timely contribution to an essential debate in international economic governance, a debate that we hope will fulfil the historic promise of voice and representation made at Monterrey.'
"Jose Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Economic and Social Affairs"
The essays by the experts collected in this volume clarify the positions of developing countries. They constitute an invitation to experts in the industrial countries and the European Union to further enrich this debate.'
"Leo van Houtven, Former Secretary and Counsellor, IMF"
This book looks beyond long-standing deadlocks on issues of representation and accountability with innovative and feasible proposals for positive reform.'
"Professor Jan Aart Scholte, Professor in Politics and International Studies and Co-Director of the ESRC/Warwick Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation"
These essays provide hard ammunition for the debate about what exactly should be done.'
"Robert Hunter Wade, Professor of Political Economy, Development Studies Institute, LSE"
This timely volume directs attention to the unreformed governance structures of the twin organizations, reflected among other things by the way they still select their leaders, and by their unbalancedvoting procedures.'
"Laurence Whitehead, Official Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, Oxford"
Sixty years after their creation, the Bretton Woods institutions face a crisis of legitimacy that impairs their credibility and effectiveness. At the roots of this crisis lies the unrepresentative nature of their structure of governance, which places control of the institutions in the hands of a small group of industrial countries that do not use its resources. Developing countries and economies in transition are considered to be minor partners, despite accounting for half of the world's output in real terms, most of the world's population and encompassing the most dynamic economies and the largest holders of international reserves.
Reality has outpaced the evolution of thinking on the subject of governance. The growing breach between world economic and financial realities and the governance structure of the Bretton Woods institutions argues for reforms to increase the effectiveness and restore the legitimacy of these institutions. As debtors, the European countries had resisted conditionality during the first decades of the IMF and favored increasing Fund resources, but as their situation changed, they no longer resorted to IMF support, they changed their position.
The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.
Ariel Buira is Director of the G24 Secretariat. He has been Special Envoy of the President of Mexico for the UN Conference on Financing for Development, Ambassador of Mexico, a Senior Member of St. Antony's College at Oxford University, Member of the Board of Governors of the Bank of Mexico and Executive Director of the IMF. His publications include "Challenges to the World Bank" (Anthem Press, 2003) and "The IMF and the World Bank at Sixty" (Anthem Press, 2005).

Sixty years after their creation, the Bretton Woods institutions face a crisis of legitimacy that impairs their credibility and effectiveness. At the roots of this crisis lies the unrepresentative nature of their structure of governance, which places control of the institutions in the hands of a small group of industrial countries that do not use its resources. Developing countries and economies in transition are considered to be minor partners, despite accounting for half of the world's output in real terms, most of the world's population and encompassing the most dynamic economies and the largest holders of international reserves. The quota formulas should reflect the size of the economies of members, i.e. their GDP, their exposure to trade and capital movements as well as their ability to contribute to the Fund. If IMF quotas were based on objective measures, i.e. size of GDP, the volatility of receipts, the adjustment of European quotas for intra-trade and trade in a single currency in the euro area, the quota share of developing countries and economies in transition as a group should be no less than that of industrial countries. Reality has outpaced the evolution of thinking on the subject of governance. The growing breach between world economic and financial realities and the governance structure of the Bretton Woods institutions argues for reforms to increase the effectiveness and restore the legitimacy of these institutions. As debtors, the European countries had resisted conditionality during the first decades of the IMF and favoured increasing Fund resources, but as their situation changed, they no longer resorted to IMF support and they changed their position. Similar problems appear in the World Bank, giving rise to large negative flows of resources from the developing countries. The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy, would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.