In a 1996 letter to President Clinton, Senator Pat Moynihan wrote, 'the computer has been a blessing; if we don't act quickly, however, it could become the curse of the age.' The Senator was commenting on a date-generated computer bug that became known as Y2K (Year 2000). President Clinton would eventually describe it as 'one of the most complex management challenges in history.' Margaret Beckett, Chair of the British Cabinet Committee on Y2K, would describe the UK government's response to it as 'the largest co-ordinated project since the Second World War.' The US government and UK government spent billions on preparations. And, in the end, virtually nothing happened. Did this mean success? Despite the scope and cost of Y2K it has received almost no critical analysis, academic or otherwise, since it occurred.

This book examines comparatively the US and the UK governments' management of Y2K and considers the extent to which such management can be understood as responses to market pressures, public opinion and organized interests. It concludes by providing valuable lessons to those concerned about managing risk and critical infrastructure today.